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Sebastian Elischer 
 
Do African parties contribute to democracy?  
Some findings from Kenya, Ghana and Nigeria1 
 
 
Abstract 
 
It is often said that ethnic and clientelistic parties are bad for democracy. 
Empirical testing of this claim has been hindered by lack of agreement on 
what constitutes an ethnic or clientelistic party. This paper proposes a con-
ceptualization and operationalisation of different party types as part of a 
succinct typology of parties. The usefulness of the empirical typology of 
political parties is then verified for three African countries: Ghana, Kenya, 
and Nigeria. In addition, ‘democratic’ party behaviour, both within parties 
and among them is investigated. Subsequently, the claim about the sys-
temic consequences of party types is tentatively tested with a comparative 
design covering three African cases that display variation on both causes 
and outcomes. The findings indicate that programmatic parties behave 
most democratically and that, moreover, there seems to be a relationship 
between a party’s internal democracy and the way it interacts with other 
parties. 
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n the extant literature on the subject of democratisation there is wide-
spread agreement on the crucial role of political parties for democratisa-
tion. Being the link between society and political decision-makers their role is 
of particular importance in the still emerging post-Third Wave democracies 
(Schattenschneider 1942, Bratton and van de Walle 1997, Lindberg 2007). Af-
rican parties operate in an especially challenging environment given the 
socio-economic conditions and the multi-ethnic makeup of their respective 
countries. As a result they are seen as devoid of ideological coherence, heav-
ily personality-driven and relying on an ethnic support base (Carothers 2006: 
                                                 
1  The author wishes to thank Matthijs Bogaards, the editor and the anonymous reviewers 
for their help and advice. 
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34-38). The recent trend towards the emergence of the dominant party sys-
tem identified by Bogaards (2000 and 2004) further raises doubts about the 
ability of African political parties to constructively contribute to the process 
of democratisation. This study starts with the hypothesis that if parties are 
ethnic or clientelistic they do not adhere to democratic procedures. In doing 
so it examines the following questions: Which types of parties are prevalent 
in Africa’s multi-party democracies? And what is their respective relation-
ship with democratic procedures? As it is interested in both differences 
across parties and countries it treats both countries and parties as units of 
analysis.  
Initially it will outline a framework of comparison, which analyses Afri-
can parties using two dimensions: Firstly, their generic type; in this regard 
the study distinguishes between ethnic, clientelistic and programmatic par-
ties. As the subsequent discussion will outline, these are not mutually exclu-
sive categories as their defining properties are matters of degree. Secondly, 
their relationship to democratic procedures; here the study scrutinises the re-
lationship between parties and democratic norms with regard to inter- and 
intra-party competition. Subsequently this framework will be applied to a 
variety of politically significant parties in Kenya, Ghana and Nigeria. These 
countries have been chosen as all three exhibit different party types with di-
verse relationships to democratic norms. Therefore these cases illustrate not 
only differences across countries but help to assess the empirical value of the 
framework employed. In order to identify significant parties the study uses 
the criteria outlined by Sartori (2005:108). The conclusion will summarise the 
results and examine whether or not there is a potential link between a ge-
neric party type and its respective acceptance level of democratic rules.  
Framework for Comparison 
African parties have rarely been compared in a systematic manner, as most 
research consists of case-studies. The study of voting behaviour highlights 
the role of ethnicity in party politics (Morrison 2004, Nugent 1999 and 2001, 
Fridy 2007 and Kandeh 1998). Accordingly ethnicity is seen as a major ana-
lytical yardstick in classifying African parties. Another large body of the lit-
erature analyses the particular nature of the African state, especially its clien-
telistic or neo-patrimonial nature (Bayard 1993, Chabal and Daloz 1999). In 
general political scientists regard clientelism in conjunction with ethnicity as 
decisive factors in determining elite behaviour and simultaneously as severe 
impediments to democratic consolidation. While clientelism and ethnicity 
are seen as joint pillars on which African political life rests, important con-
ceptual differences between the two are often neglected. Lemarchand (1972) 
argued that although clientelism and ethnicity rarely operate independently, 
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ethnicity refers to a group phenomenon while clientelism refers to a person-
alized relationship.2 Thus political networks of power based on ethnicity are 
restricted to include supporters whose mutual interest is dependent on a mu-
tually shared perception of cultural affinities.  
‘[C]lientelism, on the other hand, extends these perceptions beyond the 
realm of primordial loyalties and establishes vertical links of reciprocity be-
tween ethnically or socially discrete entities’ (Lemarchand 1972:70).  
Accordingly clientelism at the societal and the political level might lead to a 
higher identification with members of different communities and thus lead 
to a more inclusive political system, which manages to accommodate ‘ethnic 
discontinuities’ (Lemarchand 1972: 70).  
Drawing on the initial considerations offered by Lemarchand, Joseph 
established several types of party structures based on different relationships 
between clientelism and ethnicity. Acknowledging the enduring influence of 
clientelism in African politics, Joseph defines an ‘ethnic party’ as one in 
which clientelistic clusters correspond to ethnic-linguistic groups. In this sce-
nario ethnicity is the stronger of the two forces in shaping the structure of a 
party. His alternative party structure, the ‘clientelistic party’ transcends ethnic 
boundaries; it is kept together by clientelistic exchanges, which cut across 
ethnic lines. Joseph further does not exclude the possibility that a third type, 
the ‘ideological party’ might emerge in the long-run. Being driven by certain 
programmatic ideas the programmatic party type still maintains clientelistic 
networks and can be ethnic as well as trans-ethnic in nature (Joseph 1987: 58-63).  
Unfortunately Joseph did not elaborate any further on how to identify 
these different types but stopped at the level of general considerations. The 
following indicators appear reasonably suited to distinguish all three types 
in greater detail: 
Leadership composition: Leadership composition is a good indicator for exam-
ining the set-up of political parties, especially since membership figures in 
African parties are rarely kept and even if so, rarely updated.3 It tells us if 
parties are able to recruit their leaders nationwide or if their leaders are con-
fined to specific areas.  
Intra-party factions: The nature of party factions indicates the nature of a 
party. Opposing factions modelled solely around ethnic lines indicate ethnic 
                                                 
2  Lemarchand is associated with a primordial view of ethnicity. While taking his general 
considerations between the interaction of ethnicity and clientelism as starting point, this 
study adheres to a constructivist concept of ethnicity as outlined by Kasfir (1976).  
3  In this study party leadership refers to the top positions in a political party including the 
chairman, the vice-chairman (or vice-chairmen depending on the party’s constitution), the 
secretary-general, and the national treasurer. 
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parties. Factions modelled around individuals drawing support from all over 
the country indicate clientelistic parties. Factions modelled around ideologi-
cal groupings are a sign of programmatic parties.  
Party goals: How do parties appeal to voters? An ethnic party will generally 
appeal to ethnic unity, a programmatic party to abstract ideas and a clientelis-
tic party is likely to stress national unity or other generally uncontested ideas.  
Election results, party nationalisation scores (PNS) and party system nationalisa-
tion scores (PSNS): Election results indicate a party’s strongholds. Party na-
tionalisation scores (PNS) provide a useful means of comparing different 
parties’ electoral support nationwide both within and across countries.4 The 
PNS is measured by calculating the Gini coefficient of a party’s electoral 
support and subtracting the coefficient from 1. The closer the PNS is to 1, the 
more the party’s support can be seen as national. The closer it is to 0, the less 
its support is nationwide. The party system nationalisation score builds on 
the former and is an equally useful tool to compare party systems.5 Clientel-
istic parties can be assumed to have a higher PNS and PSNS than ethnic par-
ties. Just as the ethnic parties they might have strongholds yet they are not 
reduced to particular regions. Programmatic parties can be expected to dis-
play a high PNS and PSNS.  
It is worth repeating at this point that all of the party types outlined by 
Joseph are mixed-types. Ethnic as well as programmatic parties still might 
have a clientelistic character. Yet ethnic parties show a preference in terms of 
who the recipient of resources is, while the clientelistic type transcends eth-
nic boundaries. Given that most African parties are assumed to be multi-
ethnic in composition (Erdmann 2007) it might be very difficult to empiri-
cally distinguish between a clientelistic and a multi- ethnic party. When ex-
actly does a multi-ethnic party qualify as ‘trans-ethnic’ and thus ‘clientelistic’? 
One way of determining is to use Donald Horowitz’s distinction between 
ethnic and non-ethnic parties: While the non-ethnic party is able to bridge its 
country’s dominant ethnic cleavage lines which previously divided society, 
the ethnic party fails to do so (Horowitz 2000: 295-305). In order to qualify as 
non-ethnic (in our case clientelistic) the party further must be able to ensure 
internal cohesion over a period of several electoral cycles without falling 
apart into ethnic parties6 (Horowitz 2000:367). One consequence of this dis-
                                                 
4  As parties are the units of analysis, parliamentary election results have been used to 
calculate these various indicators. They further have the advantage of being less subjected 
to electoral rigging as the recent examples of Kenya and Zimbabwe indicate.  
5  For an application of both measures to the Americas and further elaboration on their 
calculation see Jones and Mainwaring (2003).  
6  The above represents only a very condensed discussion of Horowitz’s party types. 
Horowitz actually referred to this as permanent coalition of ethnic parties.  
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tinction is that our type of the ‘ethnic party’ includes mono- and multi-ethnic 
parties. This is an abstraction, yet it serves our purpose of examining the re-
lationship of ethnic parties with democracy in general. 
Having elucidated the distinction between the ethnic and the clientelistic 
party we now require a further clarification of the relationships between the 
programmatic and the ethnic as well as between the programmatic and the 
clientelistic party. The framework employed assumes the programmatic type 
to be trans-ethnic in composition. This does not deny the possibility that a 
party whose outreach is reduced to specific communities cannot be 
grounded on programmatic ideas. Cases such as the KPU in Kenya of the 
late 1960s (Geertzel 1970) or the Action Group in Nigeria of the early 1960s 
(Sklar 1963) are cases in point. However, the present framework is based on 
the assumption that the programmatic orientation of such a party is derived 
from its ethnic base. In other words: It supports programmatic ideas because 
they are conducive to the well-being of its comparatively narrow member-
ship. Again the KPU and the Action Group are examples of this. Thus (multi-) 
ethnic parties with a programmatic content – should they have any – will be 
regarded as ethnic in character. In order to be classified as truly program-
matic a party is required to have a nationwide following.  
This sets out the relationship between the clientelistic and the pro-
grammatic party: Like the clientelistic party, the programmatic party man-
ages to bridge the country’s dominant cleavage lines yet in addition is moti-
vated by programmatic ideas. While in the context of Western politics it has 
been ascertained what constitutes ‘programmatic ideas’ (Lipset and Rokkan 
1967, Klingemann et al. 1994 and Klingemann et al. 2006) no agreement exists 
on what could be seen as a genuine programmatic statement by an African 
party. Statements in favour of ‘good governance’ or ‘law and order’ could be 
seen as programmatic in an African context. Yet using these criteria as a 
means of differentiating parties has in practice proven unsatisfactory as too 
much similarity exists across parties and countries.7 The discussion of the 
various cases – in particular the Ghanaian one – will prove the traditional 
right-left cleavage model to be a useful starting point for an examination of 
African parties; all the more so in the absence of alternative frameworks.8  
Finally one should note that this study does not presuppose our party 
typology to be complete. Other party types such as, for example, a ‘personal-
istic party’ modelled around a strong leader wanting to achieve specific goals 
appear a priori a possibility. Yet this study starts from the well-established 
assumption (see discussion above) that the two dominant forces of African 
                                                 
7  This is the result of party manifesto analysis as well as newspaper archive research 
conducted by the author in the three countries under discussion.  
8  This article has grown out of the author’s dissertation project. One of its aims is to arrive 
at a new framework for examining party ideology in Africa.  
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politics are ethnicity and clientelism. It is first and foremost interested in the 
interaction between either of these two phenomena and democracy at the 
aggregate level of political parties. The programmatic party has been offered 
as the one alternative, again based on already existing literature. A succinct 
typology such as ours further has the advantage that it provides for a man-
ageable analysis. Table 1 summarises the main characteristic of each party 
type in detail.  
Table 1: Party Types and Their Indicators 
Indicators 
Party Type Leadership & 
Cabinet 
Composition 
Factions & 
Internal 
Cohesion 
Goals Election Results, 
PNS and PSNS 
Ethnic ?reflect ethnic 
cleavage 
lines 
?ethnic and op-
posed leading 
to break-ups 
?in favour of 
group interests 
?identifiable 
strongholds 
?low to medium 
PNS and PSNS 
Clientelistic ?bridging 
dominant 
cleavage 
lines 
?non-ethnic; 
internally 
stable  
?’catch-all’ 
rhetoric 
?strongholds but 
medium to high 
PNS and PSNS 
Programmatic ?bridging 
dominant 
cleavage 
lines  
?non-ethnic or 
programmatic 
internally 
stable 
?programmatic  ?strongholds but 
medium to high 
PNS and PSNS 
Source: Author’s Compilation 
Of great significance for the debate on democratic consolidation in post-
Third Wave democracies is the question of how these party types relate to 
democratic procedures. Although parties per se are not included in any defi-
nition of democracy, they are posited at the interface between citizens and 
political competition. Given the multi-facet functions parties fulfil (represen-
tation, societal integration, issue aggregation, political recruitment and train-
ing etc.) they have the potential to successfully contribute to democratic con-
solidation. It is just as possible, however, that they might fail to act in line 
with democratic rules and perpetuate despotic rule (Bratton and van de 
Walle 1997, Randall and Svasand 2002, Lai and Melkonian-Hoover 2005, 
Creevy, Ngomo and Vengroff 2005). Ethnic and clientelistic parties are often 
assumed to impact negatively on democratisation. The politicisation of eth-
nic divisions is frequently associated with the subsequent destabilisation of 
parties and party systems due to their lack of interest in governing society as 
a whole and because of their so-called ‘out-bidding effect’. Accordingly, the 
emergence of one ethnic party in an ethnically segmented society ‘infects’ 
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hitherto non-ethnic parties. As a result, subsequent elections turn into an 
‘ethnic census’, which is detrimental to democratic stability (Chandra 2005: 
236-239, Mitchell 1995: 774-780, Horowitz 2000). Clientelistic parties are also 
seen as destabilising factors for democracy. They foster the ‘big man’ rule 
which is conducive to power concentration within parties and countries (van 
de Walle 2003). In elections fought by clientelistic parties the stakes are as 
high as in elections contested by ethnic ones because continuous access to 
government is a requirement to ensure the survival of the party (Warner 
1997: 535-541).  
In order to distinguish generally between parties which are contributing 
to democratisation and those which are not, this study uses Diamond and 
Gunther’s distinction between pluralistic and proto-hegemonic parties. The 
proto-hegemonic type strives towards the replacement of the existing plural-
ist society with one that is suited to its goals. The pluralistic type accepts the 
winning of free and fair elections as the only legitimate way of achieving 
their objectives. Proto-hegemonic parties further try to prevail over opposi-
tion groups inside the party by excluding them from access to leadership po-
sitions. By contrast pluralistic elites aim at internal hegemony by democratic 
means and by refraining from excluding alternative groups from running the 
party (Diamond and Gunther 2001: 16-17). Accepting these two types as the 
general starting point raises the question of how to differentiate between 
them. Lindberg (2004: 66-70) proposes a variety of indicators, which can be 
used to judge the democratic quality of elections. Some of these have been 
taken and modified to examine the democratic quality of parties both at the 
level of intra-and inter-party democracy. Table 2 below summarises these. 
Table 2: Assessing Parties’ Acceptance of Democratic Norms 
 democratic/pluralistic undemocratic/hegemonic 
intra-party level 
Alteration of 
leadership  
democratic alteration none/ undemocratic 
leadership election elections by delegates appointments by leader 
peacefulness internally stable threatened by splits/non-
accepting of election outcome 
inter-party level 
Accepting of defeat yes no 
Electoral conduct  fair/tolerant use of intimidation and threats 
Rhetoric issue-based/accepting of other views aggressive 
Source: Author’s Compilation 
At the level of intra-party democracy a clear indication of the quality of de-
mocracy or the lack thereof is whether or not leadership alterations take 
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place (Scarrow 2005). Connected to this is the way these come about: Are 
leaders elected democratically or merely appointed by a strongman? Also, 
partly related to this is the extent to which party factions relate to one an-
other. If they accept the outcome of leadership elections and do not work 
against the common good of the party, the democratic quality of a party can 
be seen as more advanced than if that is not the case. The degree of internal 
party stability is an outcome of this. The literature on intra-party democracy 
has at times stressed candidate selection procedures as an important indica-
tor. Öhman (2004) has provided an elaborate framework for examining these 
and further provided its application to Ghana. Unfortunately there is no such 
data available on Nigeria as most of the relevant party congresses were 
closed to public scrutiny or not reported on by newspapers. In the case of 
Kenya data is also missing due to the high fluctuation of parties. As the dis-
cussion will show, this might be indicative of their respective generic type 
yet it does not allow for the inclusion of this variable.  
At the level of inter-party democracy a party’s (non)acceptance of elec-
toral defeat clearly is the most important indicator. Party rhetoric and elec-
toral conduct further illustrate its nature. If a party for example bans oppo-
nents from certain regions it clearly lacks basic democratic credentials. On 
the other hand a party which stresses issues – be they programmatic in na-
ture or highlighting the fact that certain groups are under-represented in the 
nation at large – can more safely be assumed to accept democracy as the 
‘only game in town’. 
The subsequent section will apply the framework to Kenya, Ghana and 
Nigeria in turn. It will examine both the particular party type in place and 
the relationship of that type with democratic procedures to see if there is any 
link between the two as assumed in the literature.  
Political Parties in Kenya, Ghana and Nigeria  
Kenya: The enduring logic of ethnic politics 
Party competition was legalised in Kenya in late December 1991 after several 
decades of one-party rule under the Kenya African National Union (KANU). 
Immediately afterwards the opposition formed the Forum for the Restoration 
of Democracy (FORD), whose leadership set-up incorporated representatives 
of all major communities. A few months into its formation the FORD split 
into the FORD-Asili and the FORD-Kenya as its two main leaders, Oginga 
Odinga (Luo) and Kenneth Matiba (Kikuyu) failed to overcome their respec-
tive ambitions to become the FORD’s presidential candidate. Subsequently 
both the FORD-A and the FORD-K rapidly developed into parties represent-
ing Kikuyu (FORD-A) and Luo/Luhya (FORD-K) interests, which was evi-
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dent in terms of their leadership set-up as well as their electoral support 
(Throup and Hornsby 1998: 150-172).9 The FORD-K further disintegrated as 
its Luo and the Luhya wing fought viciously over its leadership. The Luo 
wing under the leadership of Raila Odinga eventually defected to form the 
National Development Party (NDP), whose support was confined to the Luo 
dominated eras of Nyanza Province;10 simultaneously the FORD-K declined 
to a party whose outreach was reduced to Luhya leaders and followers.  
In addition to the FORD, the Democratic Party (DP) emerged also in late 
1991 as a breakaway faction from the KANU under the leadership of Mwai 
Kibaki and John Keen. At its formation the DP included Kikuyu elites but 
also smaller communities such as the Kamba, the Meru or the Masai. As the 
FORD and later the FORD-K, the DP was equally unable to stay united. Feel-
ing marginalised by the dominance of Kibaki’s personality and his wealthy 
Kikuyu entourage, John Keen from the Masai as well as Charity Ngilu and 
Agnes Ndetei from the Kamba left the party;11 while Keen and Ndetei de-
fected back to the KANU, Charity Ngilu took over the Social Democratic 
Party (SDP), which had hitherto been unknown to the wider Kenyan populace 
and transformed it into a party which openly advocated Kamba interest.12 In 
accordance with their respective leadership composition the DP and the SDP 
could claim Kikuyu areas in Central province and Kamba regions in Eastern 
province as their respective strongholds. Thus, due to ethnic factionalism and 
ethnic rivalry, the Kenyan democratic opposition had reached a situation of al-
most complete fragmentation into several (mono-) ethnic parties by early 1998.  
On the governing benches at the time, the KANU showed ethnic bias in 
favour of the Kalenjin community of President Moi as well as in favour of the 
many smaller communities such as the Masai, the Turkana and the Samburu. 
the KANU’s ethnic bias manifested itself in terms of Cabinet appointments, 
which show a clear marginalisation of the Kikuyu and Luo.13 Just as the op-
position parties the KANU had clearly identifiable strongholds, in particular 
the Kalenjin and minority-tribe dominated Rift Valley, the Luhya areas in 
Western and the Kissi areas in Nyanza province. 
The ethnic nature of political parties was further evident in the parties’ 
rhetoric. Both the original FORD as well as the FORD-K splits were accom-
panied by heavy ethnic undertones. The defection of the Luo wing from the 
                                                 
9  All references to election outcomes in this paper are derived from official election data 
provided by the respective Electoral Commission.  
10  Daily Nation, November 13, 1997. 
11  Daily Nation, August 31, 1997. 
12  For an example of Ngilu’s ethnic rhetoric, see Daily Nation, June 9, 1995. 
13  For an overview of Cabinet appointments see Daily Nation, January 14, 1993 and Daily 
Nation, January 10, 1998. 
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FORD-K for example was pursued after extensive consultation with Luo eld-
ers by Raila Odinga (Badejo 2006). Charity Ngilu’s pro-Kamba stance has al-
ready been mentioned. the KANU in particular played on ethnic divisions 
when it came to ensure electoral superiority. This was largely pursued by 
cabinet ministers appealing to their communities to understand that their 
welfare was intrinsically linked to the welfare of the KANU. In May 1994 for 
example, Cabinet Minister Joshua Angatia (Luhya) announced that the Lu-
hya community would strengthen its political bargaining power if Western 
Province became united in the Kanu.14 Kenya’s Minister for Co-operative 
Development, Munyi, called on the Meru people to vote for the KANU if 
they wanted to receive further governmental assistance.15 Moi himself re-
peatedly warned against a revival of GEMA and told his Kalenjin commu-
nity to be on guard against a looming Kikuyu attack on the Presidency.16 
Following two consecutive defeats at the hands of the KANU and 
President Moi the opposition changed strategy. This was further necessitated 
by the KANU’s merger with the NDP into the New KANU, which the gov-
erning party pursued in order to cement its majority hold over parliament. 
The NDP highlighted the fact that the New KANU represented first and 
foremost a unique opportunity for the Luo people to regain power.17 Partly 
in response to the New KANU, partly in response to two consecutive elec-
toral defeats the DP, the FORD-K and the SDP in conjunction with 14 smaller 
parties formed the National Alliance Kenya (NAK). Yet both alliances 
proved short-lived. In the run-up to the 2002 elections the New KANU disin-
tegrated over Moi’s ‘appointment’ of Uhuru Kenyatta (Kikuyu) as his pre-
ferred successor and the KANU presidential candidate. Faced with a re-
united opposition Moi intended to secure a Kikuyu bloc vote by appointing a 
prominent yet inexperienced Kikuyu politician. To lure the Kikuyu back into 
the KANU fold had indeed been a long-term strategy by the top KANU 
leadership throughout the later part of the 1990s (Peters 1997). The conse-
quences of this strategy highlight the fragile nature of the KANU-LDP 
merger: A significant number of New KANU leaders under the leadership of 
Raila Odinga (Luo) decided to break away from the KANU over the issue of 
a Kikuyu presidential candidate and defected to the Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP), which also included leading Kamba and Luhya politicians. The 
LDP then merged with the NAK in order to form the National Alliance Rain-
bow Coalition (NARC). The NARC proved to be the first and so far only na-
tionwide alliance, which managed to include all of Kenya’s major ethnic 
                                                 
14  Daily Nation, 23 May 1994. 
15  Daily Nation, 22 February 1994. 
16  Daily Nation, 3 May 1996. 
17  Daily Nation, 11 May 1998. 
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groups without falling apart before election day (Ndegwa 2003). However as 
early as two weeks into the Kibaki Presidency initial tensions became visible 
between the different ethnic wings which made up the NARC (Kadima and 
Owuor 2006). The NARC Kikuyu MPs for example voted for fellow Kikuyu 
from opposition parties when it came to the selection of prestigious chair-
manship positions of parliamentary committees.18 Kibaki himself appointed 
several ministers closely associated with Kenyatta’s former hawkish Kikuyu 
elite including Njenga Karume, John Michuki or Kiraitu Murungi.19 The de-
teriorating relationship between them and the rest of the NARC came to a fi-
nal end over Kibaki’s refusal to initiate constitutional reforms, which would 
have seen the creation of a strong executive prime minister, a position prom-
ised to Raila Odinga as part of the agreement which had brought the NAK 
and the LDP together. This in return led to the formation of the Orange De-
mocratic Movement (ODM) led by Odinga and eventually also Kibaki’s 
Party of National Unity (PNU). Again the split had a clear ethnic dimension 
to it: while the former was driven by Luo and Kalenjin politicians, the latter 
became a Kikuyu-led party. While both included representatives of all other 
communities, both equally failed to bridge the division between Luo and Ki-
kuyu as well as Kikuyu and Kalenjin. A similar fate befell the KANU, the 
new opposition party. Its new chairman Uhuru Kenyatta (Kikuyu) soon 
faced stiff opposition by William Ruto (Kalenjin), Moi’s former right-hand 
and the party’s Kalenjin stalwart. Just as the NARC, the KANU split in two 
with the Kalenjin wing breaking away and forming a new party.20  
In retrospect it seems clear that the Kenyan political society has been 
consistently divided along ethnic lines. At least at the aggregate level of po-
litical parties two of the country’s dominant ethnic cleavage lines, namely the 
division into Luo and Kikuyu as well as into Kalenjin and Kikuyu, (Widner 
1992, Geertzel 1970) were at no point in time overcome. Accordingly, all sig-
nificant political parties in Kenya between 1992 and 2007 represent ethnic 
parties. Though the country’s dominant ethnic cleavages were at times over-
come, these periods proved to be short-lived and tactically motivated. The 
case of the NARC is especially illuminating for this study: even though it 
was the party in government and thus had access to resources of patronage, 
the centrifugal forces of ethnicity proved stronger. Table 3 and 4 illustrate the 
various processes of political reconstruction in Kenya.  
                                                 
18  Daily Nation, March 20, 2003.  
19  Karume was the chairman of the Gikuyu, Embu and Merus welfare association in the 
1970s, which aimed at ensuring the continuation of a Kikuyu presidency after Kenyatta’s 
death, while Michuki was his assistant Secretary-General. All three are said to have had 
unlimited access to Kibaki, while high-ranking members of NARC such as Odinga or Ngilu 
did not.  
20  The East African Standard, January 22, 2006. 
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Table3: Parties and their Constituents, 1993-1998 
FORD (1991) 
All major communities 
 
FORD-A (1992) 
Kikuyu 
FORD-K (1992) 
Luo, Luhya 
FORD-A 
Kikuyu 
FORD-K 
Luhya  
LDP (1997) 
Luo 
DP (1991) 
Kikuyu, Kamba, Masai 
DP 
Kikuyu 
SDP (1996) 
Kamba 
DP 
Kikuyu 
SDP 
Kamba 
KANU 
Kalenjin, Luhya, Kamba, Masai 
KANU 
Kalenjin, Luhya, Kamba, 
Masai 
KANU 
Kalenjin, Luhya, Kamba, 
Masai 
Table 4: Parties and their Constituents, 1998-2007 
NAK (2002) 
DP, FORD-K, NKP (=SDP) 
NARC (2002) 
NAK, LDP 
PNU (2007) 
DP, FORD-K, KANU 
(Kenyatta wing) 
ODM (2005) 
LDP, KANU (Ruto wing), 
NPK 
New KANU (1999) 
KANU+LDP 
KANU (2002) 
- 
Source: Authors Compilation 
 
Having established the ethnic nature of Kenyan political society leaves the 
question of their acceptance of democratic procedures. All of Kenya’s parties 
have demonstrated their unwillingness to accept and/or compromise over 
the outcome of party leadership elections. The disintegration of the FORD, 
the defection of the Luo wing from the FORD-K to the NDP, the defection of 
the Kamba wing from the DP to the SDP and in more recent months the 
disintegration of the KANU as well as the split of the NARC into the PNU 
and the ODM are cases in point. In all instances leadership election outcomes 
were challenged legally in court and – having been fought unsuccessfully – 
resulted in party splits. Indeed the high salience of ethnicity has proven to be 
incompatible with intra-party democracy. Externally the reality is the same. 
Throughout various election campaigns party leaders advised political oppo-
nents not to enter their respective strongholds. Similarly during election-free 
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periods parties regularly ‘forbade’ opposition parties to recruit members in 
their strongholds (Rutten et al. 2007). Parties further frequently referred to 
ethnic militias to intimidate and harass opposite-minded voters (Human 
Rights Watch 1993 and 2008). The 2007 elections have been deeply fraught 
with electoral rigging by both government and opposition and their respect-
tive inability to concede even the possibility of defeat. Skeptical voices inside 
Kenya have argued for a long time that the only reason why the KANU in 
2002 did accept its loss of the grip of power was the sheer dimension of the 
NARC’s victory, which simply left no room for political manipulation.21 The 
examples above indeed indicate the peaceful hand-over of power in 2002 as 
constituting an exception rather than a new period in Kenyan political his-
tory.  
Ghana: Towards the consolidation of political society 
In Ghana the political struggle of the democratic opposition against J.J. Raw-
lings’ military regime followed a distinctly different pattern. Their political 
society has been structured around two main political parties, which so far 
have shown a high degree of stability. Shortly after the inauguration of the 
Fourth Republic in January 1992, the opposition formed the New Patriotic 
Party under the leadership of Adu Boahen (Akyem/Akan). The leadership 
composition of the NPP has always been dominated by personalities from 
Ashanti or other Akan communities, yet it has consistently managed to bridge 
the country’s dominant cleavage lines between Akan and Ewe as well as 
North and South (Danso-Boafo 1996: 70-95). While initially the NPP incorpo-
rated only a few leading figures from the Ewe dominated Volta region such 
as Major Courage Quarshigah, a representative of the Ghanaian military and 
outspoken opponent (and cousin) of Rawlings, in more recent years the Ewe 
faction in the NPP leadership has seen a growth in numbers as has the 
party’s share of the vote in Ewe populated areas.22 Since the first multi-party 
elections in 1992 it has become the norm in the NPP to award the slot of the 
vice-presidential candidate to a Northerner. Although the NPP is at times 
often perceived as an Ashanti/Akan-only party, being Ashanti has at times 
been a disadvantage for prospective candidates contesting for the leadership 
of the party as party strategists believed an Ashanti party leader would 
foster that perception.23 After winning the 2000 elections, NPP cabinets have 
                                                 
21  Dr. Tom Wolf, paper presented at a non-public workshop of the British Institute for East 
Africa, Nairobi, January 10, 2008.  
22  This is the result of my own analysis of the NPP leadership over a certain time 
conducted with the help of various media resources, including Daily Graphic, Daily Guide 
and Statesman.  
23  Daily Dispatch, November 28, 2005 
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shown a similar ethnic balance as the NPP as a whole (Ayensu and Darkwa 
1999: 101-105). It was also under an NPP government that for the first time in 
history a Muslim was appointed vice-president.  
Internal party factions are largely modelled around powerful individu-
als. From the early to the mid-1990s the party was divided into two camps 
one led by Adu Boahen (Akyem/Akan) and one led by John Kufour (Ashanti/ 
Akan), who eventually prevailed to win the party’s 1996 and 2000 presiden-
tial candidature (Agyeman-Duah 2006:50-63). Since the mid-1990s Nana-
Akufo Addo (Akyem/Akan) has emerged as the alternative power centre 
within the NPP and is now set to take over Kufour’s role as presidential 
candidate in the upcoming 2008 elections. While all three are from Akan 
communities, all three have nationwide followings within the party. John 
Kufour secured the leadership of the party – as well as later the Presidency – 
by riding on the wave of support given by party delegates from areas the 
party traditionally underperforms in.24 The example of Kufour illustrates that 
ethnicity clearly matters less than individual leadership while in Kenya 
individual leadership and ethnicity coincide. This is not to deny the existence 
of ethnic factions inside the party: the Nasara Club for example has at times 
been a powerful lobby group for the party’s Muslim members and candi-
dates for top party positions. Yet in great contrast to Kenya these factions 
have refrained from excluding others from party leadership positions. It does 
not come as a surprise that the political rhetoric of the NPP has been one of 
continuous reassurance towards those communities, who voted for alter-
native parties.  
On the opposite side of the political divide the National Democratic 
Congress (NDC) was formed simultaneously in 1992 as a follow-up to the 
previous military administration the People’s National Democratic Congress 
(PNDC). Just as the PNDC, the NDC was led by J.J. Rawlings, who between 
1992 and 2000 determined all party appointments.25 If the NPP has at times 
been alleged to be an Ashanti party, the NDC has been equally suspected of 
being the party of the Ewe and the North. Rawlings himself hails from the 
Ewe community and once famously referred to the Ewe populated Volta 
region as his World Bank on election day (Nugent 2001). Yet, despite this and 
despite a bias in favour of the Volta and the Northern regions in terms of 
Cabinet appointments, the NDC leadership has been cross-cutting along 
ethnic lines before and after being in power. John Atta Mills, an Akan from 
the Fante tribe, who became Rawlings’ handpicked successor as the NDC 
presidential candidate is a case in point. The NDC’s defeat in 2000 has led to 
the rise of two major factions, a pro- and an anti-Rawlings wing. The former 
                                                 
24  The Statesman, February 13, 2000. 
25  Between 1992 and 2001 the NDC constitution explicitly recognised Rawlings as party 
founder and leader.  
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comprises fervent supporters of Rawlings’ military coup of December 1981, 
which they regard as crucial in ridding the nation of what they perceive to be 
corrupt elitist big men politicians. In addition they view the former military 
dictator’s populism as essential in securing future electoral success. Their 
opponents have long been calling for greater inner-party reform and the 
emancipation of the party from its founder. Prominent representatives of the 
reformist wing include Obed Asamoah (Ewe), who was narrowly elected 
NDC chairman in 2002 and Kwesi Botchwey (Akan), who lost out against 
Atta Mills in the race to become the party’s 2004 presidential candidate.26 The 
reformist wing has further insisted on refocusing the party’s propaganda 
machinery on social democratic ideological lines and less on the charisma of 
Rawlings.27 Therefore inner-party rivalry is driven by different conceptions 
about the future direction of the party, a debate, which is linked to different 
party leaders. As in the NPP ethnicity neither divides the NDC nor do the 
major party factions coincide with ethnicity. Table 5 and 6 below display the 
PNS and PSNS for Kenya and Ghana. They confirm quantitatively what has 
already been established in the discussion so far. In general party 
nationalisation cores are consistently higher in Ghana than in Kenya with the 
historical exception of the NARC.  
Table 5: PNS for Ghana and Kenya 
Ghana 
1992 n/a28 
1996 .65 
2000 .73 
NPP 
2004 .80 
1992 .88 
1996 .89 
2000 .74 
NDC 
2004 .86 
National Average  .79 
                                                 
26  Daily Graphic, December 23, 2002.  
27  Daily Graphic, April 4, 2003.  
28  The NPP boycotted the 1992 parliamentary elections. For details see discussion on inter-
party democracy in Ghana below.  
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Kenya 
1992 .61 DP 
1997 .57 
1992 .56 FORD-K 
1997 .45 
1992 .60 FORD-A 
1997 .42 
NDP 1997 .42 
SDP 1997 .48 
1992 .68 
1997 .76 
KANU 
2002 .73 
NARC 2002 .84 
ODM 2007 .70 
PNU 2007 .66 
National Average  .61 
Source: Author’s compilation from official elections results provided by the respective Elec-
toral Commissions.  
One must note that the figures for the KANU are biased in favour of a higher 
PNS: In several KANU strongholds the KANU MPs were returned unop-
posed due to a lack of alternative candidates. If elections had taken place, the 
number of votes for the KANU would have been drastically higher, which 
would have reduced the PNS to the disadvantage of the KANU, as the 
party’s votes would have been spread less equally nationwide. Party system 
nationalisation scores prove even more clearly that overall Ghanaian political 
parties consistently had a more nationwide following than their Kenyan 
counterparts.  
Table 6: PSNS for Ghana and Kenya 
 1992 1996/97 2000/02 2004/07 
Ghana n/a .70 .70 .74 
Kenya .59 .54 .62 .42 
Source: Author’s compilation from official elections results provided by the respective Elec-
toral Commissions.  
In addition, all major Ghanaian political actors have displayed allegiance to 
distinct political ideologies. The NPP has, from its inception, regarded itself 
as a follower of the Danquah-Busia tradition, a Ghanaian political strand of 
thinking favouring the free market and individual enterprise. Its election 
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campaigns of the early 1990s referred to the failure of communism and state-
owned enterprise in Eastern Europe by which the NPP saw its own ideals to 
be vindicated.29 While in opposition NPP leaders have shown great verbal 
support for tax reform benefiting the middle and entrepreneur classes.30 
Since taking over the reins of power the NPP’s express aim has been the 
creation of a ‘property owning democracy’ a goal it reiterates at almost every 
public occasion. As already mentioned there are growing tendencies within 
the NDC to incorporate the principles of social democracy.31 On various 
occasions NDC leaders have condemned the NPP’s concept of ‘property-
owning democracy’ as creating social exclusion.32  
But though it would be short-sighted to ignore both parties’ ideological 
credentials, it would be equally naïve to classify both as purely programma-
tic. Within Ghana the political debate is dominated by issues largely devoid 
of ideology such as infrastructure development or corruption. Therefore 
while ideological foundations do impact on the Fourth Republic the political 
discourse is more often than not overshadowed by non-ideological matters. 
In addition to this, any discussion about the outcome of leadership 
competition in the NPP and the NDC must note that at any party congress 
potential candidates have provided extensive amounts of money to delegates 
in order to secure their nomination. This is more indicative of clientelism 
than programmatic ideals.  
There remain differences within Ghanaian political society with regard 
to intra-party democracy. Within the NPP leadership positions have been 
contested by a variety of individuals and, in great contrast to Kenya, all party 
contests concluded on conciliatory notes between losers and winners. This is 
especially true of the position of the presidential candidate, which through-
out the 1990s was heavily contested between Adu Boahen and John Kufour 
and later between Kufour and Akufo-Addo. The aftermath of Kufuor’s 
victory over Nana Akufo-Addo is illuminating for this study: being a mem-
ber of the so-called G-15, a group of extremely wealthy party financiers, 
Akufo-Addo did not withdraw his support from Kufour instead he chose to 
serve in two consecutive Kufour cabinets. In addition NPP congress dele-
gates have consistently resisted orders from the leadership when it comes to 
choosing the party’s top executive. At the 2005 congress Kufour openly sup-
ported Stephen Ntim over Peter Mac Manu for the position of NPP chair-
                                                 
29  The Statesman, August 23, 1992. 
30  The Statesman, August 23, 1992. 
31  Interview with Ht. John Mahama MP, vice-presidential candidate of the NDC Accra, 
April 8, 2008.  
32  For examples see Daily Graphic, December 6, 2004 and Daily Graphic, October 25, 2004.  
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man. In the end Mac Manu succeeded narrowly.33 Thus NPP congresses have 
proven to be closely contested, defiant of orders from above and thus some-
what unpredictable. The NDC on the other hand experienced democratic 
contests only after 2000. Before Rawlings’ departure from the Presidency 
individuals were pre-selected for specific positions. While most observers 
saw in the chairmanship of Obed Asamoh a turn towards greater acceptance 
of democratic norms, the party’s 2005 congress reversed that trend. Asamo-
ah’s landslide defeat against Kwabena Adjei, a former minister of agriculture 
and Rawlings close confidante, saw the defection of leading personalities of 
the NDC’s reformist wing to the newly formed Democratic Freedom Party. 
Their exit was accompanied by widespread complaints about the pro-Raw-
lings personality cult, violent threats and harassment of anti-Rawlings party 
activists.34 However, the emergence of John Mahama as Mills vice-presiden-
tial candidate, against the wish of Rawlings and many others, was a clear 
sign that the democratisers within the NDC were still a strong force to be 
reckoned with and, given the age-structure of all individuals involved, they 
will possibly claim the party’s future.  
At the level of inter-party competition both parties have increasingly 
accepted democratic rules. While the 1992 presidential elections were marred 
by allegations of massive fraud by the NPP, which later boycotted the 
parliamentary elections, since 1996 all elections have taken place in a compa-
ratively peaceful and calm manner. Having followed the constitutional 
requirement to step down after two terms in office and having accepted his 
party’s defeat in the closely fought 2000 elections, J.J. Rawlings has at times 
been associated with attempts to overthrow the NPP government with the 
help of the military. Yet it is not possible for outsiders to determine whether 
or not these accusations were ever warranted. Both parties respected the 
outcomes of the 1996, 2000 and 2004 elections overall even though the res-
pective loser referred to several cases of administrative shortcomings, alleged 
vote buying or abuses of incumbency (Center for Democracy and Develop-
ment Ghana 2005a and Center for Democracy and Development Ghana 
2005b). These however can be safely discarded as non-decisive in terms of 
the electoral outcome. In general then it seems reasonable to classify both 
parties as pluralistic even though internally the NDC still incorporates non-
democratic tendencies.  
Nigeria: Towards the autocratic one-party state 
In contrast to Kenya and Ghana multi-party democracy returned to Nigeria 
as late as 1999. The transition from military rule to multi-party democracy 
                                                 
33  The Statesman, 18 December, 2005.  
34  Daily Graphic, April 8, 2006 and Daily Graphic, December 29, 2005.  
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was facilitated by the sudden death of Sani Abacha and thereafter witnessed 
the rise of a variety of political entities preparing to re-enter the political 
scene. Most of these eventually came together under the roof of the People’s 
Democratic Party (PDP). Its official founders became known as the so-called 
G-34, a conglomerate of personalities from all corners of the Nigerian federa-
tion, who had openly opposed Abacha’s continuous stay in power. It was led 
by Alex Ekwueme, an Igbo, who had been the initiator of the idea of a 
rotating Presidency at the Nigerian constitutional conference in 1995.35 Other 
powerful groups within the newly formed party included the Northern-
dominated People’s Democratic Movement (PDM) led by Atiku Abubakar, 
who presided over the political network of the late Shehu Musa Yar’Adua, 
who together with Olesegun Obasanjo had returned the country to civilian 
rule in the late 1970s. The PDP further incorporated equally powerful 
Northern generals such as former long-term military despot Ibrahim Babangida, 
who became one of the party’s large-scale financiers and initially the driving 
force behind the Obasanjo Presidency.36 The successful transformation of 
such diverse groups into one political party constituted a novelty: For the 
first time in Nigerian history a powerful political party whose outreach was 
not narrowed to one of the country’s three main ethnic communities, Yoruba, 
Hausa or Igbo, emerged and remained in existence. Indeed by deciding to 
silently subscribe to the idea of rotating the Presidency between North and 
South as well as prescribing an ethnically balanced party leadership struc-
ture,37 the PDP explicitly learned from the lessons of Nigeria’s failed First 
and Second Republic. To provide access to power for all three major groups 
within the party has indeed been a constant imperative that the PDP has 
successfully implemented over the years.38 Furthermore, the party has been 
keen on creating ethnically balanced cabinets as well as other high-ranking 
government positions such as that of the Senate President or the Speaker of 
the National Assembly.39  
Ever since its foundation the PDP has witnessed intense struggles between 
the different groups, which make up the party. The early years of Obasanjo’s 
Presidency saw heavy infighting between the PDM and the G-34 over party 
leadership positions as well as the presidential nomination in 1999 and 2003. 
On both occasions the PDM secured landslide victories. These led to an ever 
growing influx of military personal into the leadership structure of a party 
originally founded by civilian dissidents. Victor Gemade for example, the 
                                                 
35  The News, November 16, 1998.  
36  Africa Confidential, February 19, 1999.  
37  These are prescribed in article 7.2 (c) of the PDP’s Constitution as amended in 2001.  
38  Tempo, November 4, 1998.  
39  Vanguard, December 12, 2003. 
Do African parties contribute to democracy? 194
PDM’s (and Obasanjo’s) candidate for the position of PDP chairman in 2000, 
is known to have been an influential supporter of the Abacha regime and 
previously acted as the chairman of one of Abacha’s fake parties.40 While 
during his first term Obasanjo had been heavily dependent on the goodwill 
of the PDM, his vice-president Atiku and initially also on the support of 
Ibrahim Babangida, he increasingly cut ties with his former support groups 
once he had secured a second term. His re-election saw the immediate 
appointment of Ahmadu Ali, a retired colonel and former member of his 
military administration as the new PDP chairman. By 2005 the complete top 
level of the party consisted of former generals and police officers loyal to 
Obasanjo.41 By that time, most members of the G-34 had left the party or 
were faced with disciplinary actions for allegedly working against the 
party.42 The recently concluded 2007 elections were anteceded by the final 
fall-out of Obasanjo and his former mentor and vice-president Atiku over the 
presidential nomination of the PDP. With Obasanjo trying to seek constitu-
tional amendments to allow him a third term in office, Atiku mobilised his 
supporters to bring down the affected bill in the Senate. The latter’s success 
led to his temporary expulsion from the vice-presidency and his subsequent 
defection to the Action Congress (International Crisis Group 2007a: 5-7). 
Factionalism in Nigeria’s political society is clearly driven by strong power-
brokers relying on a nationwide following. Neither the G-34, nor the PDM 
nor the Obasanjo camp showed any ethnic bias in terms of their allocation of 
positions. The G-34 was national in terms of its composition and its 
conviction to keep the country united; the PDM, even though Northern-do-
minated, was essential in ensuring a Yoruba Presidency and could count on 
the loyalty of state governors across the country; Obasanjo himself drew his 
support less from his Yoruba home base but from close political cooperation 
with Northern generals as well as financial support from godfathers, who 
originated from all over the Federation.43  
While the party has taken the lessons of history with regard to dealing 
with the divisive issue of ethnicity, it has failed to live up to its democratic 
aspirations. Leadership struggles within the PDP have been exceptionally 
ruthless. In order to get the PDP aligned state governors to support his 
renewed candidacy in 2003, Obasanjo and his then-ally Atiku promised all 
                                                 
40  Vanguard, November 11, 2002. Amongst other things Gemade planned Abacha’s 
transitional programme to multi-party democracy, which was abandoned due to Abacha’s 
death.  
41  Daily Trust, March 6, 2005.  
42  Vanguard, November 18, 2005. 
43  For an overview of godfatherism and its impact on Nigerian politics and the Obasanjo 
administration see: Human Rights Watch (2007): Criminal Politics. USA: Human Rights 
Watch.  
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PDP governors to free them of intra-party opposition to their renewed bid 
for power irrespective of the various legal suits levelled against them.44 
Eventually Obasanjo secured his second nomination and all governors were 
returned as PDP candidates.45 Politically motivated (attempted) assassina-
tions have also returned to Nigeria46 with former PDP chairman Gemade 
being one of the most well-known victims. Originally allied to Obasanjo and 
Atiku, Gemade attracted the wrath of Obasanjo after he pursued the ex-
pulsion of Chris Uba, Obasanjo’s nephew-in-law, brother of one of Obasanjo’s 
close political advisors and a widely feared political godfather of Anambra 
state. Throughout the period of Obasanjo’s reign Uba had been involved not 
only in financing the PDP’s various campaigns in the Eastern region but also 
in kidnapping a state governor after the latter refused to allocate state con-
tracts to him. In an open letter Ogbeh accused Obasanjo of complicity in this 
affair, which led to his immediate political downfall. In January 2005 Ogbeh 
was pressured into resigning his post.47 In late August that year his house 
was raided by armed bandits, for which Ogbeh blamed the PDP. 
In the month leading up to his failed third term bid, Obasanjo again 
tried to bring the governors on his side, this time by using Nigeria’s Eco-
nomic and Financial Crimes Commission to either intimidate them or bring 
them in line (International Crisis Group 2007a). The relationship between the 
Obasanjo dominated executive and the legislative was equally turbulent. 
Various Senate Presidents were pushed out of office by the party in order to 
ensure trouble-free pro-government legislation.48 In mid-2003 for example 
Obasanjo threw his weight behind Senator Adolph Wabara to become the 
new Senate President at a time when Wabara had actually lost his Senate 
constituency to an opposition candidate. An electoral appeal panel reinstated 
Wabara, who subsequently did indeed become Senate President.49 In recent 
years, leadership elections have been increasingly less contentious with the 
Obasanjo wing taking full control over candidate selection and their pro-
spects of success.50 The nomination of Alhaji Yar’Adua as Obasanjo’s suc-
cessor fits that pattern: after the breakaway of Atiku’s Action Congress, no 
alternative but an Obasanjo-friendly candidate was feasible. 
                                                 
44  This Day, January 7, 2003.  
45  This Day, December 31, 2002. 
46  Vanguard, March 19, 2004. 
47  This Day, January 11, 2005.  
48  For a summary of Senate Presidents and their rocky relationship with Obasanjo see This 
Day, October 22, 2003. 
49  This Day, May 23, 2003.  
50  Daily Trust, December 12, 2005 and Africa Confidential, November 17, 2006. 
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Open rigging and massive abuse of incumbency have characterised the 
most recent 2007 elections, which national and international observers have 
condemned as an attempt by the Nigerian government to implement a one-
party state (International Crisis Group 2007b, European Union 2007). Al-
ready the 1999 and 2003 elections witnessed large-scale irregularities, which 
clearly biased the governing party; the most frequently quoted incidents 
were the announcements of results in areas where no election had taken 
place or where the count had not been concluded.51 This scope of electoral 
rigging in conjunction with the very violent nature of Nigerian elections 
greatly questions their basic validity, which is why election results are not 
taken as indicators for Nigerian political society. Overall, the PDP clearly 
reflects the key characteristics of a clientelistic-hegemonic party52.  
Conclusion 
This study has sought to contribute to the literature on African parties and 
democratic consolidation in several ways. Firstly, drawing on existing litera-
ture, it has devised an analytical framework for comparing parties across 
countries. Secondly it has applied this framework to Kenya, Ghana and 
Nigeria respectively. Thirdly, and most importantly, its results have revealed 
significant differences between parties across countries with regard to both 
their generic type as well as their willingness to conform to democratic rules.  
In Kenya all significant parties have consistently failed to integrate all 
major groups of the Kenyan state into one political force. Consequently all 
are ethnic parties. The classification of Ghanaian parties is less clear-cut: 
Parties exhibit ideological agendas, while incorporating clientelistic elements. 
The PDP as the only significant Nigerian party is purely clientelistic. Their 
respective relationship with democratic procedures is equally diverse. In 
Kenya and Nigeria parties do not accept democratic rules. By contrast, in 
Ghana both the current governing party and increasingly also its opposition 
have engaged in closely fought competitions over party positions as well as 
national office. Both have accepted electoral outcomes without resorting to 
electoral fraud, as has been prevalent in Nigeria, or rejecting the possibility 
of electoral defeat, as in Kenya. It is interesting to note in this context that a 
party’s relationship to intra-party democracy reflects its interaction with 
democratic procedures in general: Parties which are democratic internally 
also accept democracy as ‘the only game in town’. 
                                                 
51  Weekly Trust, May 3, 2003. Also see: European Union Observation Mission 2003 
52  The examination of Nigeria is reduced to the PDP for two reasons: Firstly, the 
opposition parties cannot be regarded as relevant political forces using Sartori’s criteria. 
Secondly, an examination of these parties would not add substantially to the argument of 
the relationship between democracy and parties advanced here. 
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This study confirms the view that clientelistic and ethnic parties are 
unwilling to abide by democratic rules while parties with at least a minimal 
ideological content do. Given parties’ intermediary role between state and 
society, democratic consolidation appears less likely in states in which 
parties fail to include programmatic ideas. However these conclusions are 
only of a tentative nature given this article’s narrow scope as a small study. 
An increase of cases is needed to prove or disprove the robustness of a link 
between a party type and its democratic acceptance level. Such extended 
studies will also be better able to examine systemic factors which might be 
responsible for the appearance of different generic party types such as for 
example ethnic fragmentation, economic conditions or the type of party 
system in place.  
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Zusammenfassung 
Leisten afrikanische Parteien einen Beitrag zur Demokratie? Einige Befunde aus 
Kenia, Ghana und Nigeria 
Ethnische und klientelistische Parteien werden häufig als Hindernis für Demo-
kratisierung angesehen. Eine empirische Austestung dieser Behauptung ist bis-
weilen jedoch nicht möglich, da eine genauere Unterscheidung zwischen beiden 
Parteientypen in der Literatur fehlt. Die vorliegende Analyse versucht, diese Lücke 
zu schließen, indem sie verschiedene Typen von Parteien konzeptionalisiert und 
operationalisiert. Anschließend wird diese Typologie auf drei verschiedene afri-
kanische Länder angewendet: Ghana, Kenia und Nigeria. Zusätzlich wird das 
Verhältnis zwischen einzelnen Parteitypen und demokratischen Verhaltenswei-
sen innerhalb und zwischen Parteien untersucht. Diese Verhaltensweisen werden 
mit Hilfe verschiedener Indikatoren gemessen. Die empirischen Ergebnisse zei-
gen, dass nur programmatische Parteien in einem positiven Verhältnis zu demo-
kratischen Verhaltensweisen stehen. Des Weiteren existiert ein Zusammenhang 
zwischen dem internen und dem externen Verhalten von Parteien. 
Schlüsselwörter 
Politische Partei, Ethnie, Demokratisierung, Kenia, Ghana, Nigeria 
Résumé 
Est-ce-que des parties politiques africaines contribuent  à la démocratie? 
Quelques analyses de Kenya, Ghana et Nigeria 
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On considère souvent les partis politiques à base ethnique et clientéliste comme 
mauvais pour la démocratie. Une vérification empirique de cette affirmation s’est 
jusqu’à présent heurtée à la difficulté de définir exactement ce qu’est un parti 
ethnique ou clientéliste. Cette contribution propose une conceptualisation et une 
opérationalisation des différents types de partis politiques. La typologie proposée 
est appliquée par la suite à trois pays africains: le Kenya, le Ghana et le Nigéria. 
Les affirmations sur les conséquences systémiques des différents types de partis 
politiques sont testées par une analyse comparative de trois cas africains, très 
différents les uns des autres. Les résultats montrent que les partis politiques 
programmatiques se comportent le plus démocratiquement. En outre, il semble 
qu’il y a un lien entre le fonctionnement démocratique interne d’un parti et la 
manière dont il interagit avec les autres partis politiques.  
Mots clés 
parties politiques, ethnie, démocratisation, Kenya, Ghana, Nigeria 
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